The Continued Persecution of the Kurdish People in Turkey by Crawford, James L.
American Indian Law Review 
Volume 45 Number 2 
2021 
The Continued Persecution of the Kurdish People in Turkey 
James L. Crawford 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr 
 Part of the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James L. Crawford, The Continued Persecution of the Kurdish People in Turkey, 45 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 327 
(2021), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol45/iss2/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University 




THE CONTINUED PERSECUTION OF THE KURDISH 
PEOPLE IN TURKEY 
James L. Crawford* 
Kurds have no friends but the mountains. 
— Kurdish Proverb1 
Introduction 
On September 13, 2007, the General Assembly adopted the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) by an 
overwhelming majority.2 The UNDRIP was a product of over two decades 
of negotiations.3 In response to the Assembly’s adoption of the UNDRIP, 
Les Malezer, a Chairperson of the Global Indigenous Caucus, asserted that 
“the United Nations and indigenous people had found common ground” by 
enshrining rights that were already approved by the United Nations system 
but denied to indigenous people.4  
While there was a significant consensus on the declaration’s provisions, 
some countries, including the United States, expressed “concerns over 
provisions on self-determination” and the possibility they might be 
construed as giving indigenous peoples rights to “veto national legislation 
and State management of resources.”5 Expanding and clarifying the 
definition of indigenous people under the UNDRIP to include the Kurdish 
people will provide clear rights recognized by the greater international 
community, helping the Kurdish people to maintain their culture and 
heritage in the face of persecution.  
                                                                                                                 
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. Quoted in Chikara Hashimoto & Egemen B. Bezci, Do the Kurds Have ‘No Friends 
but the Mountains’? Turkey’s Secret War Against Communists, Soviets and the Kurds, 52 
MIDDLE E. STUD. 640, 640 (2016). 
 2. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples; ‘Major Step Forward’ Towards Human Rights for All, Says 
President, U.N. Press Release GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Press Release, GA 
Adopts UNDRIP], https://www.un.org/press/en/2007/ga10612.doc.htm (“By a vote of 143 in 
favour to 4 against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States), with 11 
abstentions, the Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.”).  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  
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The subject of the independence of the Kurdish people in the Middle East 
is one which has been at the forefront of my mind for nearly two decades. I 
spent over fifteen years in the United States Marine Corps before retiring in 
2018. During my time in the military, I served as both an infantryman and an 
intelligence specialist. Over the course of my career, I deployed to the Middle 
East a total of three times with nearly two years spent living with, interacting 
with, training, and, at times, fighting against the many cultural and ethnic 















I trained and taught our allies to not only improve in their ability to 
protect themselves and their land from our common enemies, but I also 
managed and conducted their troops in a way that would garner their 
respect and loyalty. During my second deployment, I was embedded with 
an Iraqi infantry battalion. During this time, I lived among Iraqi soldiers, 
including Iraqi Kurds. In doing so, I interacted with them on a personal 
level, heard their stories, learned about their families, ideals, and opinions 
of the then-current political atmosphere.  
During my third deployment to the Middle East, I split time between 
Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan, where I again lived and 
worked with members of these countries’ military for an extended period. 
This time afforded me a unique opportunity to immerse myself within the 
cultures of these countries and gain insights not possible any other way.  
The history of the Kurdish people in the entire Middle East is riddled 
with violence and rebellion, mistreatment and suffering, and neglect and 
uprising. In Part I, this Comment introduces the background and history of 
the Kurdish people. Then, in Part II, this Comment examines Turkey’s State 
of Emergency Declaration, and the United Nations reports on subsequent 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol45/iss2/4
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human rights violations. Part III explores Turkey’s domestic law regarding 
the Kurdish people. Part IV discusses the Turkish Judiciary’s role in 
Kurdish repression. Part V details the UNDRIP and ambiguities of who 
qualifies as indigenous peoples. Finally, this Comment analyzes the legal 
status of the UNDRIP in Part VI. This Comment not only sheds light on 
some of the history of the Kurdish people, but also discusses how the 
governments they pledge allegiance to have continually sought assimilation 
of the Kurdish people by seeking to remove their culture, language, 
identity, and basic human rights.  
I. Background/History 
A. Kurdish People: Origin and Historical Issues Up to World War I 
The Kurdish people are a storied group with a long history of 
marginalization and subjugation. “It is a sad feature of the Kurdish question 
that the only times it is brought to our notice is at moments of conflict.”6 
For at least the last 3,000 years, the Kurdish people have occupied the 
mountainous regions that comprise portions of modern-day Turkey, Syria, 
Iraq, and Iran.7 Historically, the Kurdish people consisted of independent 
nomadic tribes known for their abilities to survive through numerous 
difficulties, including the onslaughts of conquering armies marching across 















                                                                                                                 
 6. David McDowall, The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review, in THE KURDS: A 
CONTEMPORARY OVERVIEW 8, 8 (Philip Kreyenbroek & Stefan Sperl eds., 1992).  
 7. Edgar O’Ballance, THE KURDISH STRUGGLE 1920-94, at 1 (1996). 
 8. Id.  
Figure 2 (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018) 
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The first time the Kurdish people are seen in history is in 400 B.C. during 
their retreat to the Black Sea where they attacked the Xenophon’s Ten 
Thousand.9 In the seventh century, Islamic armies advanced through the 
region, “forcibly convert[ing]” the Kurdish people to Islam.10 Arabs were 
among the first to refer to this group of people as “Kurds,” which was 
derived from the word “Kardu.”11 This word refers to the mountains in the 
region.12 Whole populations of tribes were eliminated, as Mongols and 
Turkomans invaded Kurdish lands.13 
 Loyalty to a tribe generally stemmed from a mixture of kinship to tribe 
members and the territory in which the tribe was settled but was not 
commonly based on one or the other.14 It is difficult to measure loyalty 
among the Kurdish people as their relations were rife with conflict; strong 
leaders gained loyalty and support just to overthrow other tribal leaders or 
to join with the ruling government of the time.15 Tribal leaders were even 
willing to control surrounding tribes on behalf of the government if the 
reward was high enough.16 This relative balance between the government 
and tribes was maintained for centuries as long as the government did not 
disturb the Kurdish territories and, in turn, the Kurdish people did not 
disturb the government.17  
Upon the final withdrawal of the Mongols, the Ottoman Turks made 
their way into the region and clashed with the Persians, who sought control 
of Anatolia and Mesopotamia.18 By the time of the Crusades, the Kurdish 
people built a reputation of military effectiveness by fighting against those 
who interfered with them and in their military service to the regimes in 
which they were subject.19 The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries brought a 
                                                                                                                 
 9. McDowall, supra note 6.  
 10. O’Ballance, supra note 7.  
 11. McDowall, supra note 6.  
 12. O’Ballance, supra note 7.  
 13. Id. 
 14. McDowall, supra note 6, at 9. 
 15. Id. at 9–10. 
 16. Id. at 10 (“As recently as the 1950s, when asked by a British diplomat what he 
would do about a Kurdish tribe that was in revolt, the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said 
replied, ‘Oh, it’s quite simple, I shall send a bag of gold to a neighbouring chief.’”). This 
lack of true loyalty to their own tribesman and culture played a significant part in hindering 
their efforts to unify and promulgate an independent Kurdish state. 
 17. See id. at 10.  
 18. O’Ballance, supra note 7.  
 19. McDowall, supra note 6. 
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time of expansion for the Kurdish people as they began to extend their 
territory northward through battle.20 During the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514, 
both the Persians and the Turks sought to stabilize the bordering territory 
with Kurdish cooperation.21  
Following the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514, the Kurdish people aided the 
Ottomans in defeating the Persian Empire in the region.22 The Ottomans 
gifted the Kurdish commanders land and titles both to encourage their 
loyalty and in anticipation of their assistance in driving the Persians further 
east.23 In accepting these titles and lands, the Kurdish people became 
loosely tied to the Ottoman government.24 This tie created a divide in the 
Kurdish people connected to the Ottoman Empire and the Kurdish people 
still under Persian rule.25  
This Kurdish-Ottoman agreement was convenient and economical for 
both sides since the Kurdish people were left in relative peace and their 
respective governments were left with secure borders.26 Despite occasional 
interreligious squabbles, this period of time saw a diminished level of 
friction between the Kurdish people, who followed the Sunni sect of Islam, 
and the Persians, who followed the Shia sect of Islam.27 In 1639, an area of 
land where the Mesopotamian Plain and the Persian Plateau met was 
demarcated in the Treaty of Zohab.28 This area encompassed the territory 
inhabited by the Kurdish people.29 The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
saw little effort by either the Turks or the Persian Empire to “pacify their 
Kurds” as efforts were made to expand their empires elsewhere.30 This 
neglect by both governments resulted in an unstable “lawless tribal no 
man’s land.”31  
In the beginning of the nineteenth century, both Turkey and Persia 
entered into conflict and eventually war with Russia.32 During this time, the 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id. at 11. 
 21. Id.  
 22. O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
 23. Id. at 2. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.  
 26. McDowall, supra note 6, at 11. 
 27. O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 3. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 6. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
332 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
 
 
Turkish government took back complete control of the eastern border.33 
With similar decisions being made on the other side of the border by the 
Persian government, instability within the region grew as the Kurdish 
people were again unable to govern themselves.34 The Turkish and Persian 
governments were unable to spend time or resources on the Kurdish 
territories until the latter half of the century, resulting in further instability 
in the region and leaving the region vulnerable to Russian conquest.35 As a 
consequence of the continued Turkish and Persian power exertion, the 
Kurdish people attempted multiple revolutions.36 And while some of the 
tribes fought for complete independence, others simply wished to maintain 
the level of relative freedom they experienced during the centuries prior.37  
In 1878, the Persians strengthened their border defense and replaced 
Kurdish governors with a more direct Persian administration.38 Naturally, 
this brought dissatisfaction among the Kurdish people, who were unhappy 
with the deprivation of authoritative positions within the Persian 
government.39 As Russian troops fought the Turks, the Russians sought 
support from disenfranchised Kurdish tribes.40 In 1877, some Kurdish tribes 
joined the Russians as they fought in the eastern Anatolia area in a short-
lived rebellion.41  
After the Russians persuaded some Kurdish tribes to join their fight, 
cooperation amongst tribes grew difficult and rivalries among the Kurdish 
people grew.42 The resulting leadership void was filled by religious 
personalities, as religious figures become the primary leaders of the tribes.43 
One of the better-known religious leaders, Sheikh Ubeidullah of the 
Nakshbandi order, was among the first to suggest the Kurdish people be 
autonomous rather than ruled by two separate governments.44 In 1880, 
Ubeidullah gathered support from Kurds on both sides of the line—
Ottoman ruled and Persian ruled—and pushed east into Persian territory 
                                                                                                                 
 33. McDowall, supra note 6, at 11. 
 34. Id. 
 35. O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 6–7. 
 36. McDowall, supra note 6, at 11. 
 37. Id.  
 38. O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 7. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  
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with the intent of “pushing [out] Persian security forces” and establishing a 
“Kurdish Autonomous State,” pledging allegiance to Turkey.45  
While the Turkish government originally supported the idea of an 
autonomous Kurdish territory, it quickly backtracked after considering the 
consequences of an autonomous Kurdish territory on its volatile eastern 
border.46 This withdrawal of support from the Turkish government, as well 
as the loss of support from Kurdish tribesman, resulted in the first of many 
recorded unsuccessful attempts in securing an autonomous Kurdish state.47 
Even so, many of the tribal governors were uncomfortable with the idea of 
becoming an autonomous nation as it could have a negative impact on their 
accustomed status and power as Sunni Muslim subjects of an Islamic 
Empire.48  
In 1907, Persia was divided into two separate areas of influence: the 
north was taken by the Russians and the south by the British.49 Weak 
government caused instability within the northern region, occupied by the 
Kurdish people, allowing Turkish troops to enter in 1908.50 In 1911, the 
Tehran government sent a militarized police force to the area in efforts to 
control the unrest.51 However, this effort was unsuccessful and gave way to 
a Russian invasion in portions of the territory later that year.52  
In 1908, the Turkish government was overthrown by the Young Turks 
with the promise of reform and representation of all people in the Ottoman 
Empire.53 With this change in power and political ideals, the Kurdish 
nationals were able to form several political clubs with the goal of reaching 
other Kurdish people.54 However, the clubs were unsuccessful in reaching 
their fellow tribesman as the Turkish government saw these clubs as a 
threat and subsequently interfered in their efforts.55  
World War I began in August 1914 where the Allies fought the Central 
Powers.56 The Kurdish people and the Ottoman Empire fought alongside 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Id. at 7–8. 
 46. Id. at 8. 
 47. See id.  
 48. Id. 
 49. O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 9. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 10. 
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the Central Powers beginning in October of the same year.57 Armenian 
irregulars soon advanced into Turkey followed by the Russians.58 The 
resulting occupation led to a large-scale genocide of nearly 600,000 
Kurdish people.59 The Armenians killed and looted as they pushed forward 
into Ottoman territory until they were routed by Turkish troops.60 This 
vicious attack on the Kurdish population would be avenged as the Turkish 
government launched its own genocide campaign against the Armenians 
and then relocated the remaining Kurdish people into their de-populated 
villages.61  
In 1917, the Russian Revolution took place.62 During this revolution, 
Russian troops shot their officers and attempted to return home, procuring 
abandoned weapons and ammunition which fostered further instability 
within the Kurdish region.63 
B. Current Issues (Post-World War I) 
Today, the Kurdish people are one of the largest ethnic groups without a 
state.64 In fact, Kurdish people are the fourth-largest ethnic group in the 
Middle East and still inhabit their historical lands.65 Arguably, the modern 
drive for Kurdish independence began with the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire.66 In the aftermath of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson 
produced a Fourteen-Point Program for World Peace, stating that “non-
Turkish minorities of the Ottoman Empire should be assured of an absolute, 
unmolested opportunity for autonomous development.”67 However, the 
Kurdish people lacked unity as a group, leaving them unable to take 
advantage of the situation to demand a state of their own.68  
Instead, the Allies and the forming Turkish government ratified the 
Treaty of Sèvres, which established an Armenian state and left the Kurdish 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 11. 
 63. Id. 
 64. The Time of the Kurds, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www. 
cfr.org/interactives/time-kurds#!/?cid=soc-at-the_time_of_the_kurds-infoguide. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 12. 
 68. Id. at 13.  
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people without a state.69 In anticipation of potential conflicts between the 
newly established Armenian state and the Kurdish people, the two groups 
prepared a memorandum to allow for the establishment of a Kurdish state if 
the Kurdish people made a formal request to the League of Nations.70 This 
memorandum was included in the Treaty of Sèvres and the Turkish 
government agreed to its provisions in 1920.71 
The hopes for an independent Kurdish state, however, were quickly 
halted when Turkish General, Mustafa Kemal, led a revolt against the 
Treaty of Sèvres.72 Mustafa Kemal “repudiated his government’s 
submission at Sèvres, raised the flag of revolt in the name of the Muslims 
of Anatolia, and drove out the Christian forces in the west (Greece) and the 
east (Armenians and Soviets).”73 Concerned with a growing threat from the 
USSR, “[n]one of the Allies were prepared to enforce any of the Treaty of 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. After WWI, the Armenians rallied much support from the allies for having 
suffered so much during the war. Id. at 12. The Armenians and the Kurds presents a joint 
memorandum at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919 in preparation for becoming 
autonomous regions. Id. at 13. This memorandum was included in the Treaty of Sèvres. Id. 
Unhappy with the thought of an autonomous Armenia in Turkey, Kurdish forces along with 
Turkish officers forced the group from eastern Turkey. Id. at 13–14.  
 70. Id. at 13. The language in the Treaty of Sèvres provided: 
If after one year has elapsed since the formation of the present treaty, the 
Kurdish population of the areas designated calls on the Council of the League 
of Nations and demonstrates that a majority of the population in those areas 
wishes to become independent of Turkey, and if the Council then estimates that 
the population in question is capable of such independence and recommends 
that it be granted, then Turkey agrees, as of now, to comply with this 
recommendation and to renounce all rights and titles to the area. . . . If and 
when the said renunciation is made, no objection shall be raised by the main 
Allied powers should the Kurds living in that part of Kurdistan at present 
included in the vilayet of Mosul seek to become citizens of the newly 
independent Kurdish state. 
Id. (quoting Treaty of Peace with Turkey (Treaty of Sèvres), art 64 (May 1, 1920), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140531175547/http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1920/TS00
11.pdf). 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 14. The main goal of the “Turkish hero,” General Mustafa Kemal, was to 
purge Turkey of Christian influence and ideals to create Muslim unity. Id. Along with the 
Armenians, Kemal pushed further west to fight the Greeks to prevent them from regaining 
land they had been granted in the Treaty of Sèvres. Id. In 1922, after the signing of the 
Treaty of Lausanne, Kemal deprived the leaders of the Kurdish people of their religious 
authority. Id. at 14–15.  
 73. McDowall, supra note 6, at 14. 
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Sèvres conditions that would have involved military force; nor were they 
prepared to negotiate on behalf of . . . the Kurds.”74  
As a result, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24, 1923, 
superseding the Treaty of Sèvres.75 The Treaty of Lausanne was an 
agreement which recognized the new Ankara-based “nationalist” 
government.76 The main difference between the two treaties was that the 
Treaty of Lausanne did not recognize Kurdish national rights or even 
directly refer to the Kurdish people.77 As such, districts inhabited by the 
Kurdish people were kept under Turkish control.78 The signing of the 
Treaty of Lausanne with no mention of an independent Kurdish state 
signaled the end of Allied support for a unified Kurdistan.79 
In the early 1960s, a new regime brought some hope—albeit short-
lived—of an independent Iraqi Kurdish state. In 1963, the leader of Iraq, 
Abdel Karim Qassim, was deposed from his office in a coup.80 The reported 
response from the United States government was to support the new 
incoming government led by members of a secular Arab nationalist 
movement, the Iraqi Baath Party.81 In 1970, the Kurdish Democratic Party 
and the then-vice president of the new central government in Iraq, Saddam 
Hussein, reached an agreement.82 This agreement assured the Kurdish 
people there would be more autonomy within the Kurdish occupied regions 
of Northern Iraq.83 However, a few years later, the United States 
government saw the Iraqi Baath Party as a threat.84 President Richard 
Nixon, along with the Shah of Iran, began funding Kurdish militia groups in 
the Kurds’ pursuit of true autonomy.85  
Once again, this support for Kurdish autonomy was short-lived. In 1975, 
Iraq and Iran made a surprise agreement that forced the United States to 
                                                                                                                 
 74. O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 14. 
 75. Djene Rhys Bajalan, The First World War, the End of the Ottoman Empire, and 
Question of Kurdish Statehood: A ‘Missed’ Opportunity?, 18 ETHNOPOLITICS 13, 15 (2019). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 14.  
 80. Rick Noack, The Long, Winding History of American Dealings with Iraq’s Kurds, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2017, 4:50 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/ 
wp/2017/10/17/the-long-winding-history-of-american-dealings-with-iraqs-kurds-2/. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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cease all funding to the Kurdish rebels.86 This cessation of support 
increased the Kurdish peoples’ vulnerability to an imminent attack from 
Hussein.87 In 1984, armed conflict broke out among the Turkish Army and 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).88 During these conflicts, upwards of one 
million Kurdish people were forced to leave their homes in both rural and 
urban areas in eastern and southeastern Turkey.89 These people were forced 
to settle in urban centers as well as towns in the western and southern 
portions of the country.90  
One of the more devastating attacks experienced by the Kurdish people 
occurred in 1988.91 There, Hussein used chemical weapons against the 
Kurdish people, killing thousands of Iraqi Kurds.92 At the time of this 
attack, the United States had, again, officially ceased all relations with the 
Kurdish rebels it recently supported.93 While arbitrary arrests and torture 
were common, the Turkish state was only able to maintain control of the 
southeastern territory of Turkey though the forced evacuation of over 3,000 
villages, which forced three million Kurdish people into destitution.94  
C. The Gulf War 
The First Gulf War began when Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait in 1990, 
ending the estrangement of the United States and the Kurdish people, which 
spanned over a decade.95 Even after Iraq was defeated in Kuwait, uprisings 
from Shiite Iraqis and Iraqi Kurds continued without support from the 
United States government.96 With the close of the Gulf War in 1991, the 
United States made a policy decision to avoid the risk of destabilizing Iraq 
politically and stopped short of overthrowing Saddam Hussein—a decision 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Kurds, MINORITY RTS. GRP. 
INT’L, https://minorityrights.org/minorities/kurds-2/ (June 2018) [hereinafter World 
Directory: Kurds].  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Noack, supra note 80.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. World Directory: Kurds, supra note 88. 
 95. Noack, supra note 80.  
 96. Id. (stating that, in opposition to the Shiite groups of Iraqis and Kurds, the Iraqi 
Baath Party, led by President Saddam Hussein, was primarily comprised of members from 
the Sunni sect of Islam).  
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that would yield severe consequences for years to come.97 Hussein went on 
to crush Kurdish and Shiite rebellions.98  
Also in 1991, the United Nations made Iraqi Kurdish territory into a 
“safe haven,” providing much needed protection for the inhabitants of those 
territories.99 In the years to follow, an opposition group called the Iraqi 
National Congress was established in Kurdistan with the support of the 
United States.100 Even with this new sense of protection, divisions appeared 
among the Kurdish people.101 As a devastating result of these divisions, the 
Kurdish Democratic Party—along with the help of troops from Hussein’s 
army—attacked the Iraqi National Congress in 1996, killing many rebel 
fighters after the United States denied crucial support.102  
D. Events After September 11, 2001 
The post-war independence of Iraqi Kurds made Turkey extremely 
nervous. Bombing and counter-insurgency operations continued into 2012, 
causing death and displacement on both sides.103 Despite these violent 
occurrences, ceasefire negotiations began in October, 2012.104 In 2013, a 
ceasefire was enacted between the PKK and the Turkish government, which 
brought hope for an end to decades of dispute and violence.105 However, 
two years later, the ceasefire ended and ushered in a new wave of violent, 
destructive conflict.106 This resurgence of conflict prompted harsh 
restrictions by the Turkish government.107 In efforts to restrict PKK 
soldiers, the Turkish government severely restricted the Kurdish peoples’ 
ability to demonstrate, access websites related to their cause, and move 
freely, with the implementation of curfews.108 The Turkish government also 
limited the Kurdish peoples’ access to electricity, food, water, and medical 
                                                                                                                 
 97. ANGEL M. RABASA ET AL., RAND PROJECT AIR FORCE, THE MUSLIM WORLD AFTER 
9/11, at 3 (2004), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_M 
G246.pdf.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Noack, supra note 80.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. World Directory: Kurds, supra note 88.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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treatment.109 While the PKK is responsible for many violent attacks, the 
Turkish government responded with widespread human rights abuses, 
including torture, murder, and the mass shelling of predominately Kurdish 
areas, causing extensive destruction and displacement of hundreds of 
thousands of residents.110  
In September 2017, independence reform overwhelmingly supported by 
Iraqi Kurds raised tensions between the Iraqi cities of Erbil and Baghdad.111 
This reform caused President Haider al-Abadi to demand its annulment 
with the threat of isolation to the landlocked region.112 Independence of the 
Kurdish people in Iraq would have caused significant concern for the 
neighboring countries of Iran, Syria, and Turkey; such independence would 
likely encourage the uprising of Kurdish tribes in those countries while 
providing a place of safe harbor for Kurdish rebels.113 Turkey and the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), formed strong economic ties to 
include a prosperous oil trade, via oil pipeline, which was threatened to be 
shut down in retaliation for the independence reform.114 Despite threats, the 
KRG continued with the referendum out of fear “that U.S. support . . . will 
only dry up as the campaign against the Islamic State winds down.”115  
By 2016, Turkey successfully pushed into Syria and established a “safe 
zone” to house Syrian refugees forced to flee the violence that resulted from 
ISIS control of Syrian land.116 Taking the ninety-eight kilometer stretch of 
border between Turkey and Syria, Turkey was able to cut off the jihadists’ 
last remaining external pipeline.117 Though the idea for the “safe zone” for 
refugees was a noble reason to push for possession of this stretch of land, it 
was not the true reason for the offensive.118 The main objective of this 
move was to prevent the Syrian Kurdish militia from extending its territory 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. 
 111. The Time of the Kurds, supra note 64. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. As noted previously in this text, the Kurdish people had justifiable reluctance in 
their reliance on support from the U.S. government for continued support which explains an 
even more urgent reason to push for further autonomy and reform. See supra text 
accompanying notes 85–98. 
 116. David Gardner, Turkey’s Syria Move Takes Aim at Both Isis and Kurds, FIN. TIMES 
LTD. (Sept. 7, 2016, 2:24 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/da458526-74fa-11e6-bf48-
b372cdb1043a.  
 117. Id.  
 118. See id. 
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further than it already had by forcing ISIS troops out of the area with the 
help of U.S. air support.119 Moreover, the Turkish government used U.S. 
aims of clearing ISIS from the region to justify the removal of Kurdish 
militias within the safe zone.120  
In December 2018, the United States announced it would withdraw 
troops in Syria, following the defeat of ISIS.121 However, this decision was 
scaled back as a result of criticism from Congress and opposition within the 
Executive Branch.122 By August 2019, after threats from the Turkish 
government to launch military operations into Syrian Kurdish-controlled 
territory, the United States and Turkey set out to create the “safe zone” 
previously planned in the northeastern border area of Syria.123 This 
endeavor required the removal of trenches and other military barriers in the 
region.124 However, Turkish officials would later inform the United States 
of their plans to occupy the space rather than maintain it as a “safe zone.”125  
In 2019, President Donald Trump withdrew completely from the area, 
arguing that he was not willing to sacrifice American lives for “these 
ridiculous Endless Wars.”126 However, the decision to withdraw from Syria 
and abandon the Kurdish people was not popular among the United States 
House of Representatives.127 It voted in opposition of the withdrawal and 
passed a resolution to represent this opinion.128 Following this vote, 
President Trump signed an executive order bringing sanctions against any 
member of the Turkish government involved in the offensive strategy to 
occupy Northern Syria.129 The Treasury Secretary stated: “The United 
States is holding the Turkish Government accountable for escalating 
violence by Turkish forces, endangering innocent civilians, and 
destabilizing the region.”130  
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During this time, Kurdish forces reached an agreement with Syrian 
officials that would allow government troops to return to the northern 
border to combat invading Turkish troops.131 After this agreement, Syrian 
and Russian troops quickly entered the territory, filling the void left by the 
United States’ troop withdrawal.132 The Turkish and Russian governments 
negotiated a ceasefire, agreeing they would share supervision of the nearly 
twenty-mile-wide strip of land.133 As part of this agreement, a small number 
of United States troops would remain in areas containing oil.134  
Shortly after this agreement, a United States military raid—aided in large 
part by information gathered by Kurdish allies—was conducted in 
northwestern Syria, killing prominent ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.135 
After this operation, the Turkish government reiterated its plan to relocate 
one million Syrian refugees into the area to be used as a “safe zone.”136 
However, as of November 2019, tensions and violence in the area 
continued, with nearly two million people still in need of humanitarian 
care.137 
Throughout the Syrian conflict, Kurdish leaders in Turkey, Iraq, and 
Syria have tried to position themselves in a manner conducive with 
garnering support from international allies—particularly the United States 
and Europe.138 In 2015, a political party within the Kurdish government 
sought to increase democratic rights for all of Turkey but primarily for the 
Kurdish people.139 This push to expand Kurdish political rights was an 
attempt to boost legitimacy not only for their own people but also for 
Kurdish perceptions internationally.140 As the conflict in Syria intensified, 
the Kurdish people pushed for greater rights.141  
At the start of the war in Syria, thousands of Kurdish people were 
granted citizenship and Syria refrained from conflict with them.142 As 
fighting against ISIS continued in Syria and Iraq, Kurdish leaders used the 
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conflict as a platform to promote their own agenda, arguing that liberation 
of the Kurdish people was the same as gaining democratic rights.143 With 
continued conflict in Iraq and Syria, and the subsequent weakening of the 
governments, the Kurdish people were afforded greater opportunities to 
move forward toward autonomy.144 However, this was not the case in 
Turkey, as the Turkish government remained strong and maintained both 
military and political support from international allies.145  
The increased determination of Kurdish groups in Syria caused division 
amongst themselves and the Kurdish people of Iraq and Turkey.146 The 
emergence of the autonomous Kurdish territory in northern Syria, called 
Rojava, further divided Kurdish tribes in the Middle East.147 This 
development highlighted division within the Kurdish elite through the 
Middle East as they fought to manipulate influence within the region to 
pursue their own interests, agendas, and ideas of what the future of Kurdish 
government should look like.148  
Though the Syrian War brought a temporary degree of unity among 
Kurdish tribes, the emergence of Rojava inevitably caused division between 
the Kurdish people and emphasized their competing political interests.149 
Moreover, the possibility of autonomy for the Kurdish people in Turkey 
seemed nearly impossible when the United States chose to support the 
Turkish government rather than the Kurdish people in Turkey’s attempts to 
regain territory in the northern region.150  
II. Turkey’s State of Emergency Declaration and UN Report 
on Human Rights Violations  
In response to what has been labeled a coup attempt in 2016, the Turkish 
government declared a state of emergency leading to a “deteriorating 
human rights situation, exacerbated by the erosion of the rule of law.”151 
Stemming from serious concerns over actions taken by the Turkish 
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government after its declaration of a state of emergency, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights published a report detailing 
potential human rights violations in southeast Turkey.152  
In Turkey’s efforts to eradicate those allegedly responsible for the failed 
coup, “nearly 160,000 people [were] arrested during an 18-month state of 
emergency,” including women who were pregnant or had just given 
birth.153 Over 152,000 Kurdish civil servants were dismissed from 
government positions, including teachers, judges, and lawyers, leading to 
loss of income and eviction from publicly owned houses.154  
In 2017, Turkey conducted security operations in villages “home to, in 
large part, [] Kurdish residents and targeted citizens of Kurdish origin of all 
ages for their perceived affiliation to the PKK.”155 The United Nations 
report detailed the use of torture and ill-treatment of those in custody, 
including beatings and sexual assault by Turkish police and military.156 In 
addressing the situation in Turkey, the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights urged the Turkish government “to ensure that these allegations of 
serious human rights violations are investigated and the perpetrators are 
brought to justice” while calling for “full and unfettered access” to fully 
address the human rights situation.157 
Actions by the Turkish government resulted in the closure of Kurdish 
NGOs, the shutting down of private schools with Kurdish language 
curriculums, and the dismissal of Kurdish teachers, academics, and 
officials.158 Many Kurdish residents continue to be displaced from the areas 
they have called home for centuries.159 While the primary reason for these 
displacements remains regional conflict, other controversial development 
projects, such as the 1,200 megawatt Ilisu Dam on the Tigris River threaten 
large scale displacement within Kurdish areas.160 Minority Rights Group 
International suggests that upwards of 78,000 people may be displaced and 
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result in the destruction of valuable Kurdish heritage, some as devastating 
as the flooding and loss of the ancient city of Hasankeyf.161  
III. Turkey’s Domestic Law Regarding the Kurdish People 
In addition to their long history of marginalization and repression 
throughout Turkey and the Middle East, the Kurdish people have seen a 
concerted effort by the Turkish government to diminish or eradicate 
Kurdish culture within its borders. Since the ratification of the Treaty of 
Lausanne in 1922, the Kurdish people have “persistently been denied 
autonomy, let alone independence, and [were] also forced to assimilate into 
Turkish society.”162 Turkish attitudes toward Kurdish culture during this 
period is best characterized by a statement given by a Turkish cabinet 
minister: “I believe that the Turk must be the only lord, the only master of 
this country. Those who are not of pure Turkish stock can have only one 
right in this country, the right to be servants and slaves.”163 
Turkey has consistently sought to achieve Kurdish assimilation by 
restricting all aspects of Kurdish identity. In the 1920s and 1930s, Kurdish 
schools, religious foundations, and publications were abolished.164 In 1938, 
the use of the Kurdish language was banned, and the words “Kurd” and 
“Kurdistan” disappeared from official vocabulary for an extended period.165 
Kurdish people, using the only language they knew, were fined for 
bargaining in Kurdish in the marketplace.166 These changes led to an 
“alienat[ion] from the main-stream of public life in Turkey.”167 This ban on 
the Kurdish language, coupled with the lack of Kurdish educational 
facilities, publications, and broadcasts, tremendously impacts cultural 
expression of Kurdish people where even the most “ardent champions of 
the Kurdish cause[] find it easier to express abstract ideas in Turkish.”168 
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In the 1960s, the Kurdish people saw a temporary reprieve from overt 
cultural repression by the Turkish government.169 In 1961, a new Turkish 
constitution was drafted, allowing freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and freedom of the press.170 This period saw a “surge of 
renewed interest among the Kurds in their own cultural identity.”171 
However, the reprieve only lasted until 1967, when Turkish authorities 
barred the entrance of “publications and recordings in Kurdish into Turkey 
from abroad.”172  
After a military coup in 1980,173 a new constitution was promulgated.174 
Articles in this constitution stated that “no language prohibited by law can 
be used in the expression and diffusion of opinions.”175 Further, “[n]o 
person may publish in a prohibited language.”176  
Further exemplifying Turkish attitudes toward the Kurdish people, new 
repressive laws targeting the Kurdish language were enacted.177 For 
example, in 1983 a new law declared that “[t]he native language of Turkish 
citizens is Turkish”; citizens may not “use as a native language a language 
other than Turkish and to participate in any activity aiming to diffuse these 
languages.”178  
To Turkey’s credit, the latest version of article 10 of the Turkish 
Constitution does provide that “[e]veryone is equal before the law without 
distinction as to language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical 
belief, religion and sect, or any such grounds.”179 However, article 3 
declares Turkish as the official language of Turkey180 and article 42 holds 
that “[n]o language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to 
Turkish citizens at any institution of education.”181 As validation of its 
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policy towards minority groups including the Turkish people, Turkey 
references the Treaty of Lausanne.182  
Despite language in the current Turkish Constitution that declares 
equality under the law183 and a declaration citing intentions of “legalizing 
the use of Kurdish in Turkey,”184 there are still restrictions in place that 
effectively preclude the Kurdish people from giving their children some 
Kurdish names.185 Until recently, Turkish citizens could not use minority 
languages in naming their children.186 In July 2003, a “reform of the law 
removed the restriction on parents’ freedom to name their children with 
names ‘deemed offensive to the national culture,’ but kept the requirement 
that names should ‘comply with moral values,’ and not be offensive to the 
public.”187 However, “the law was restricted to curtailing names containing 
the letters q, w and x, which are common in Kurdish.”188 Thus, the Turkish 
laws still restrict Kurdish people “from giving their children Kurdish names 
that include these letters.”189  
IV. The Turkish Judiciary Role in Kurdish Repression 
The Turkish judiciary is one of the “pillars of the ruling order” within the 
Turkish Republic.190 Critics of the judiciary have targeted its “partisan 
attitude in political tensions, and its failure to protect human rights and 
defend democratic principles.”191 The Turkish judiciary occupies the middle 
ground between the military and the bureaucracy, acting as “hegemonic 
preservation.”192 In this role, the judiciary seeks to maintain hegemony of 
the ruling elite against the pressure of society.193 The judiciary possesses 
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“delegated power particularly ‘when the courts in that polity are generally 
inclined to rule in accordance with hegemonic ideological and cultural 
propensities.’”194 In furthering that observation, Esin Örücü195 argued that:  
the legal system in Turkey has the aspiration to erase certain 
cultures and create a new culture, thereby assimilating people 
into a chosen image, when law meets cultures which it does not 
cater for, the judge either endeavours to eradicate or ignore them 
in keeping with the vision of the founding legislator, or, where 
he can, to accommodate them within the official framework.196  
A study of judgments in Turkish courts demonstrated three positions 
regarding the judiciary’s representation of the Kurdish people: “(1) denying 
the Kurds’ separate existence and claiming their Turkishness; (2) 
acknowledging the Kurds while denying Kurdism; and (3) portraying the 
Kurds’ traditional law, culture and social structure as deficient.”197 More 
recently in civilian courts, the Turkish judiciary has resorted to 
acknowledging the theoretical existence of Kurdish people but downplaying 
any meaningful distinctions by referencing commonalities with Turkish 
language, culture, and history.198 Some courts even represent Kurdish 
people as the “‘other’ by referring to their traditions, customs, laws, and 
other aspects of Kurdish life, as ‘primitive,’ ‘backward,’ ‘bad,’ and 
‘immoral,’ thus requiring steps to modernize and civilize them.”199 
Views of Kurdish people within Turkish jurisprudence, to some degree, 
are traced back to official positions stemming from the Treaty of 
Lausanne.200 At the Lausanne Conference, the chief negotiator201 for Turkey 
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“declared the origin of the Kurdish people as ‘Turanian,’202 rejecting 
contrary arguments.”203 In a speech at the Lausanne Conference, the 
Turkish negotiator claimed that, “‘as regard[ing] manners, usage[,] and 
customs the Kurds do not differ in any respect from the Turk’”; rather, “the 
Turks and Kurds ‘form a single unit in respect of race, religion and 
manners.’”204 
Particularly in martial court judgments prior to 1990, the Turkish 
judiciary attempted to eliminate the alterity of the Kurdish people by 
supporting claims that Kurdish people were not distinct from Turks.205 
Turkish martial courts heard cases where charges “came under the umbrella 
of ‘crimes against state security,’ committed in areas where the Martial Law 
was in operation.”206 Applying views expressed at the Lausanne 
Conference, martial courts took positions claiming that “Kurds were a 
Turkish tribe and that ‘the Kurds are not racially different to Turks.’”207 
Thus, martial courts were able to “declare that the Kurds were not a ‘native 
race’ . . . of Anatolia, and announced that to claim such a thing was also 
factitious.”208 
 Prior to 1991,209 any claims of an “independent existence outside of 
‘national unity’” and protection of the Kurdish people as a distinct culture 
were banned.210 The “criminalization of Kurdism” was rooted in principles 
of Turkish nationalism serving as the “cultural nationalism” and requiring 
assimilation of all Turkish citizens into the “culture of the Turks.”211 As a 
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result, within the Turkish judiciary, “Turkish nationalism could not be 
‘discriminatory or racist’” and Kurdism was labeled as “racism,” as it was 
“assumed to be promoting an idea based on a distinct Kurdish ‘race’ with 
its language and culture.”212 After the termination of article 142, which 
made Kurdism propaganda a crime in the Turkish Penal Code until 1991, 
Turkish courts continued to justify their Kurdish views under article 7 of 
the “Anti-Terror Law as ‘separatist propaganda’ or as ‘propaganda aiming 
to blight the state’s indivisible unity with its territory and nation.’”213 
V. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 
(UNDRIP) 
The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
views the UNDRIP as the establishment of a “universal framework of 
minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the 
indigenous peoples of the world.”214 The Human Rights Council adopted 
the UNDRIP on June 29, 2006, more than a year before the General 
Assembly’s adoption.215 The General Assembly deferred consideration of 
the declaration based on objections regarding the “language on self-
determination and the definition of ‘indigenous’ people.”216  
Initially, UN member states with sizable indigenous populations217 
objected to the UNDRIP because of “concerns over provisions on self-
determination, land and resources rights and, among others, language 
giving indigenous peoples a right of veto over national legislation and State 
management of resources.”218 The United States’ representative expressed 
disappointment in the Human Rights Council’s lack of response to a call for 
further work to generate a consensus text.219 Specifically, the United States’ 
representative stated that the splintered vote “risked endless conflicting 
interpretations and debate about its application, as already evidenced by the 
numerous complex interpretive statements issued by States at its adoption at 
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the Human Rights Council, and the United States could not lend its support 
to such a text.”220 
A. Rights-Based Framework and Rights Codified Within the UNDRIP  
The UNDRIP has many provisions that would provide the Kurdish 
people in Turkey with rights to protect their cultural identity, including 
“both individual and collective rights; cultural rights and identity; rights to 
education, health, employment, language, and others.”221 The UNDRIP, 
which has now been endorsed by all countries in the United Nations and is 
a product of extensive and wide-ranging drafting participation, employs a 
“rights-based framework and uses rights-based language.”222  
This “rights-based approach encourages cooperation and consultation 
between states, Indigenous peoples, corporations, civil society and the 
wider community.”223 By adopting the UNDRIP, UN member states 
acknowledge they should engage Indigenous peoples while respecting their 
right to assert control over their property and their economic futures.224 One 
of the principle rights recognized in the UNDRIP is the right to exist.225 To 
that end, article 8 of the UDNRIP establishes that “Indigenous peoples and 
individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or 
destruction of their culture.”226 
B. Right to Self-Determination 
Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination has been “described as 
‘perhaps the most controversial and contested of the many controversial and 
contested terms in the vocabulary of international law.’”227 So it should be 
of no surprise that the UNDRIP’s provisions on the right to self-
determination are some of the most contested provisions. Some of the 
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distress with the right to self-determination stems from its roots with 
colonialism.228 The traditional view of self-determination was formed 
around the process of decolonization; generally, self-determination was 
equated to the right of peoples subject to foreign occupation to create their 
own State.229 However, a modern distinction has arisen between internal 
and external aspects of self-determination.230 This distinction resulted in the 
cessation of self-determination’s exclusive link to the idea of 
independence.231 
It is this idea of an “internal” right to self-determination that has 
garnered support “both by academics and judicial and quasi-judicial 
bodies.”232 However, states are cautious to accept any right to self-
determination for fear that groups within their borders would view the right 
to self-determination with secessionist overtones.233 It is within this context 
that UN member states voted against the UNDRIP or abstained from the 
vote.234 
Despite initial concerns from some UN member states, the UNDRIP 
includes and affirms the right to self-determination for indigenous people. 
Article 3 of the UNDRIP declares that “Indigenous peoples have the right 
to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”235 While a straightforward reading of article 3 leaves little 
clarity upon which definition of self-determination the UNDRIP asserts, the 
drafting history implies the modern view, which outlines an internal right to 
self-determination.236  
Moreover, article 46(1), when read in concert with article 3, limits the 
right to self-determination to the modern understanding. Article 46(1) of the 
UNDRIP declares that:  
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for 
any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any 
activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the 
United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
                                                                                                                 
 228. See id. at 413–15.  
 229. Id. at 414. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 414–15. 
 233. Id. at 415. 
 234. See supra note 2. 
 235. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 224, at 4.  
 236. See Barelli, supra note 227, at 416–23. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
352 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
 
 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States.237 
Regardless of the limitations imposed by article 46(1), the UNDRIP is 
the first international legal instrument that explicitly asserts the right to self-
determination to indigenous peoples.238 
Practically speaking, the right to self-determination asserted in the 
UNDRIP is defined by some as the “the right of indigenous peoples to 
freely pursue their political, economic, and social developments within the 
frameworks of their respective States.”239 Essentially, the right to self-
determination affords an indigenous group the right to participate or, more 
frankly, the right to be heard and taken seriously.240 This concept represents 
a widely invoked principle within bodies asserting indigenous rights: the 
principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC).241 FPIC is a primary 
element of the right to self-determination as it “enables indigenous peoples 
to exercise control not only over their lands but also over their destiny.”242 
Article 32(2) of the UNDRIP asserts that: 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the 
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative 
institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent 
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or 
territories and other resources, particularly in connection with 
the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or 
other resources.243 
Of note, the language in article 32(2) does not require the consent of 
indigenous peoples prior to approval of projects affecting their lands or 
territories.244 Instead, the language within article 32(2) only requires 
consultation with indigenous people with a good faith effort of obtaining 
approval.245 With that said, to comply with the provisions in the UNDRIP, 
UN member states may take legitimate steps to advance economic 
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development as long as they do so while considering the “rights of 
indigenous peoples, and particularly their right to self-determination, to 
own their lands, and to participate in the relevant decision making 
process.”246 
C. Definition of “Indigenous People” 
The UNDRIP does not provide any meaningful clarification on what 
qualifies a group as “indigenous.” In fact, one of the key areas of concern 
from members of the Human Rights Council is that “[t]here is uncertainty 
as to the text’s application or non-application with respect to tribal groups, 
ethnic groups, minority groups, and indigenous peoples.”247 Despite these 
concerns, the UNDRIP was adopted without any clarification on who 
qualifies as indigenous people risking conflicting interpretations.248  
This lack of clarity may echo sentiments from a supplementary working 
paper on the concept of indigenous peoples produced for the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights in 2007. In this supplementary 
paper, the working group expressed concerns over uncertainties as to who 
qualified as indigenous people and whether this definition included tribal 
groups, ethnic groups, or other minority groups.249 The working group 
ultimately agreed not to pursue concerns regarding the definition of 
“indigenous people,” citing its belief that a definition would not be 
necessary if the text was consistent with international law.250 Furthermore, 
the working group expressed its belief that the text should be “capable of 
being universal in its scope and application” as “indigenous situations vary 
from State to State and group to group.”251 
Acknowledging the lack of a “singularly authoritative definition of 
indigenous people” in both the UNDRIP and the greater body of 
international law, the United Nations Humans Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner does offer some criteria to help define “indigenous 
peoples.”252 In a 2013 publication, the UN Human Rights Office utilized the 
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José Martinez Cobo definition to outline pertinent factors useful in 
identifying “indigenous peoples.”253 United Nations Special Rapporteur 
José Martinez Cobo submitted a comprehensive study on discrimination 
against indigenous peoples to the Commission on Human Rights.254  
Though not officially adopted by the United Nations or the international 
community, Cobo’s definition is influential and frequently cited.255 Cobo’s 
definition of “indigenous peoples” is constructed as: 
those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and 
pre-colonial societies . . . [who] consider themselves distinct 
from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those 
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and 
transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their 
ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as 
peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems.256 
So, the utilization of Cobo’s definition would begin to form some analytical 
framework aiding in the identification of indigenous peoples.  
D. Problems with the Colonial Definition of “Indigenous” 
One issue with Cobo’s definition of “indigenous people” is that it 
revolves around language limiting “indigenous” to those people who were 
displaced through colonial conquest.257 This concept stems from the 
European doctrine of discovery where indigenous legal status and rights 
were diminished or extinguished entirely.258 This concept, and its inclusion 
as part of the understanding of indigenous people, is undoubtedly highly 
appropriate and relevant. However, limiting the definition of “indigenous 
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people” with this concept is problematic in regions such as African or Asian 
states where it is difficult to identify people who were “first in time.”259  
The African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities (African Working Group) was tasked with 
“examin[ing] the concept of indigenous people and communities in Africa” 
and “consider[ing] appropriate recommendations for the monitoring and 
protection of the rights of indigenous communities” in relation to the term 
“peoples” within the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.260 In 
its report to the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights 
(African Commission), the African Working Group expressed concern that 
“if emphasis remains on early definitions that were intertwined with 
colonisation, the African continent will be left without a suitable concept 
for ‘analyzing internal structural relationships of inequality that have 
persisted after liberation from colonial dominance.’”261  
When seeking to identify indigenous peoples in Africa, the African 
Working Group endorsed the following alternative elements:  
self-identification; special attachment to and use of their 
traditional land whereby their ancestral land and territory has a 
fundamental importance for their collective physical and cultural 
survival as peoples; and experiences of subjugation, 
marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination 
because these peoples have different cultures, ways of life or 
modes of production than the national hegemonic and dominant 
model.262 
In 2010, the African Commission applied its adapted view regarding 
who qualifies as “indigenous people” in Centre for Minority Rights 
Development & Minority Rights Group International on Behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v. Kenya.263 The Endorois people are believed to be the 
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traditional inhabitants of the Lake Bogoria area within Kenya.264 The 
Endorois people used the lowlands surrounding Lake Bogoria during the 
rainy season as grazing land for their animals and would retreat to the 
Mochongoi forest during the dry season.265 Additionally, Lake Bogoria held 
great cultural significance to the Endorois people; these people used sites in 
the area for cultural ceremonies and believe that the “spirits of all Endorois, 
no matter where they are buried, live on in the Lake.”266 
The Endorois people used this land, unchallenged, for centuries.267 In 
1973, however, the land was declared protected by the Kenyan 
Government.268 In 1986, the Kenyan government evicted the Endorois 
people from their traditional lands, resulting in a loss of many of their 
animals and economic hardships.269 After many failed attempts to regain 
access to their lands through Kenya’s legal system, the Centre for Minority 
Rights Development and Minority Rights Group International filed a 
complaint with the African Commission.270 This complaint claimed that the 
“Republic of Kenya violated their right to practise religion, their right to 
property, their right to culture, their right to free disposition of natural 
resources and their right to development.”271 
In seeking a resolution, the African Commission noted that “the terms 
‘peoples’ and ‘indigenous community’ arouse emotive debates”272 and that 
“there is no universal and unambiguous definition of the concept[s].”273 
Furthermore, the African Commission found that “the term ‘indigenous’ is 
not meant to create a special class of citizen but is linked to the notion of 
‘peoples.’”274  
Essentially, the African Commission believed that the notions behind 
indigenous peoples are “closely related to collective rights, a concept that 
can be used to address the historical and present-day injustices and 
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inequalities felt by sections of populations with nation states.”275 As such, 
the African Commission found that provisions within the African Charter 
include provisions allowing for people to retain rights as peoples in the 
collective, which includes indigenous communities.276 The African 
Commission, in effect, extended the categorization of “indigenous people” 
to include groups of people who do not fit the more traditional definition of 
indigenous peoples based on colonialization.277  
E. Turkey and the UNDRIP 
Turkey voted to adopt the UNDRIP in 2007.278 In clarifying its position, 
however, Turkey stated that the UNDRIP “was non-legally binding, but 
could serve as an important tool.”279 Moreover, Turkey declared it “did not 
have any people in its territory that could be interpreted as indigenous 
peoples . . . and believed that the Declaration referred to the exercise of 
self-determination in line with the Charter obligations regarding non-
interference in the sovereignty, integrity and political unity of States.”280  
Based on these statements, Turkey appears to follow the colonialism-
based definition of “indigenous people” and the modern interpretation of an 
internal right to self-determination. Asserting this view is most 
advantageous to Turkey since it can appear supportive of growing 
international support while denying any existence domestically.  
Turkey has already taken steps to use this position as leverage in the 
international community. In response to a 2019 U.S. Senate resolution that 
recognized the mass killing of Armenians by Turkey more than a century 
ago as genocide, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan condemned the 
resolution and threatened “parliamentary resolutions recognizing the 
killings of indigenous Americans in past centuries as genocide.”281  
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VI. Legal Status of UNDRIP 
The UNDRIP, like most United Nations declarations, is non-binding.282 
The declaration could, however, provide evidence of either a codification or 
crystallization of customary international law. Customary international law 
consists of two elements: (1) “extensive and virtually uniform State 
practice” and (2) “the belief that the practice is required by law (opinio 
juris).”283 Article 38(b) of the International Court of Justice Statute provides 
that the court should apply “international custom as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law.”284 Opinio juris requires an examination of state 
practice to determine whether there is an “understanding that such 
[practice] arises out of legal obligations.”285 Essentially, customary 
international law requires a relatively uniform and consistent state practice 
regarding a particular issue and the belief that the practice is legally 
compelled by international law.286 
The rights within the UNDRIP were ultimately accepted by the greater 
international community over thirty years ago.287 While not dispositive, the 
three-decade discussion and the thirteen-year period since the UNDRIP’s 
adoption demonstrate the international community’s acceptance of these 
rights. As such, scholars argue that some of the rights outlined in the 
UNDRIP are a codification of customary international law.288 Moreover, an 
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice provided that a UN 
General Assembly resolution, such as the UNDRIP, could provide 
“evidence for the purpose of establishing a rule of [customary international 
law].”289  
However, there is ample evidence that the states that signed onto this 
declaration viewed it as non-binding.290 So, while there is wide-spread 
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acceptance of the basic tenants of the provisions within the UNDRIP, it is 
unclear whether the UNDRIP is a codification or crystallization of 
customary international law. So, until or unless there is a demonstrable 
belief by states that the they are legally compelled to follow the provisions 
within the UNDRIP, its standing as customary international law will remain 
in doubt.291 Still, the near universal support of the UNDRIP throughout the 
international community is demonstrative of the resolution’s support and 
may represent the start of a crystallization of customary international law in 
the future.292 A further study would need to be conducted to determine if 
the UNDRIP now qualifies as customary international law. However, that is 
outside the scope of this Comment.  
Conclusion  
On its own, the UNDRIP will most likely afford little legal standing for 
the Kurdish people to pursue recourse. However, a broader and more 
defined definition that qualifies Kurdish people as indigenous people would 
provide the Kurdish people with internationally recognized rights. This 
clarification, along with Turkey’s membership in the United Nations, 
should garner the Kurdish people support from the international community 
in their battle to maintain cultural independence.  
As a stateless people, the Kurdish people are limited in what assistance 
international law might provide. Regardless of any potential legal standing, 
the Kurdish people will require support of the greater international 
community if they are to effect change in their circumstances. A clear 
recognition on the applicability of the UNDRIP to the Kurdish people will 
be an invaluable step towards that support.  
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